A Framework for the New Personalization
of Law
Anthony J. Casey† & Anthony Niblett††
Law has always strived for accurate contextualization, but only with recent
technological advances in data processing and communication has this goal become
meaningfully achievable at the personal level. While the other essays in this
Symposium explore the costs and benefits of personalizing particular areas of law,
we present a general framework for thinking about the new personalization of law.
We identify two fundamental questions that every personalization project must address: First, how do lawmakers set the objective of a personalized law? Second, how
is the content of a personalized law communicated to the citizens who must follow
it? We explore these questions and identify specific challenges they pose to any personalization project.

INTRODUCTION
Personalized law is an old concept. The idea that the law
should be tailored to better fit the relevant context to which it
applies is obvious and has been around as long as the idea of law
itself.1 Indeed, every law has some contextual parameters. The
question is how specific—or how finely tailored—those parameters will be. In a world without any frictions, an ideal law would
take all relevant (and no irrelevant) contextual factors into account. But frictions do exist, and so lawmakers face various tradeoffs when determining the context of a law.
These trade-offs have been well rehearsed.2 On the one hand,
it is costly to add more context to law. Lawmakers must discover
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See Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 27–54 (Harvard
2003) (discussing how Greek philosophers debated the appropriate breadth of the law and
questioning how individualized the law should be).
2
For an economics perspective, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992). See also Anthony J. Casey and
Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401, 1402 n 2 (2017)
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the relevant factors and then communicate those factors to the
citizens. And there is always the risk of error. On the other hand,
laws with less context can be crude and rigid. They will be overor underinclusive.3
Often, the debate about adding context turns on timing. If the
content of the law remains vague ex ante, a judge can fill in the
contextual details ex post. This is how the law of negligence
works. The judge contextualizes the rules after the alleged tort
has occurred. Doing so reduces some of the costs of contextualization. An ex post adjudicator has the benefit of hindsight in determining which factors are relevant in a particular context.
Moreover, the adjudicator needs to add content only for situations
that actually did arise rather than those that might have arisen.
Still, ex post adjudication imposes its own costs. For example, citizens live in uncertainty because no one has communicated the
specific content of the law to them, and the ex post adjudicator
may infect the process with noise, inconsistency, hindsight bias,
or her own idiosyncratic views on what the law’s objectives should
be.4 Again, this timing question has been explored for decades.5
(collecting sources that discuss the distinction between rules and standards from an
economics perspective).
3
See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decision-Making in Law and in Life 31–34 (Oxford 1991). Indeed, the literature on
the costs and benefits of using rules and standards is vast. See, for example, Kaplow, 42
Duke L J at 559–60 & n 1 (cited in note 2) (explaining the distinction between rules and
standards and collecting sources); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the
Rulification of Standards, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 803, 803 n 1 (2005) (collecting
sources); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 969–96 (1995)
(describing the strengths and limitations of rules). See also generally Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton 1990);
Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J
Legal Stud 257 (1974).
4
See generally, for example, Raz, Practical Reason (cited in note 3). For further
discussion of inconsistency, see generally Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial
Behavior, 34 Intl Rev L & Econ 9 (2013). On hindsight bias, see generally Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U Chi L Rev 571
(1998). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1523–27 (1998). For further discussion
on noise, see Daniel Kahneman, et al, Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden Cost of
Inconsistent Decision Making, 94 Harv Bus Rev 38, 40–42 (Oct 2016). For further discussion of idiosyncrasy, see Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding
of Equal Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev 439, 502 (2014).
5
The question of timing of contextualization is often framed as one of rules (providing ex ante context) and standards (providing ex post context). See, for example, Kaplow,
42 Duke L J at 581–82 (cited in note 2). But not everyone agrees that the choice between
rules and standards turns on the timing in this way. Indeed, as we have noted elsewhere,
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The question for this Symposium then becomes: What exactly
is new about personalized law? After all, a personalized law is just
a law that is more contextualized or tailored to the relevant factors facing an individual. Again, the law of negligence in its theoretical form demonstrates the point. As usually stated, the law of
negligence incorporates all relevant factors facing an individual.
It asks how a reasonable person would have acted facing the same
situation.6 The personalized context comes in through the definition of the relevant “same” situation. When all relevant factors
are taken into account—which the conventional view of tort law
would seem to require—the law as applied by the judge is fully
personalized.
But as Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat have
pointed out, that is not how the law of negligence works in the
real world.7 While the law has forever aspired to a high level of
personalization, it has persistently remained quite far from that
goal.8 Things appear, however, to be changing. As technologies associated with big data, prediction algorithms, and instantaneous
communication reduce the costs of discovering and communicating the relevant personal context for a law to achieve its purpose, the goal of a well-tailored, accurate, and highly contextualized law is becoming more achievable. And that is the “new”
personalization of law that we explore in this Symposium.
As a starting point for this inquiry, this Essay proposes a general framework for thinking about the new personalization of law.
Without such a framework, projects to personalize law run the
risk of being ad hoc and unconnected. To avoid this, we identify
two fundamental questions that lie at the heart of any move toward personalization through data and analytics.

there is wide disagreement in legal scholarship about what the words “rules” and “standards” even mean and what questions are implicated in the choice between the two forms
of law. See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1405 n 9 (cited in note 2); Anthony J. Casey,
The Short Happy Life of Rules and Standards 3:00 (Feb 21, 2017), online at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TnbRApMEumU (visited Aug 27, 2018) (Perma archive
unavailable). This is striking given the ubiquity of the concept in legal scholarship.
6
See Brown v Kendall, 60 Mass 292, 296 (1850); Alan D. Miller and Ronen Perry,
The Reasonable Person, 87 NYU L Rev 323, 329 (2012).
7
Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L Rev
627, 636–46 (2016).
8
Id at 637–46.
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The first question is how to set law’s objective. As we have
suggested in prior work,9 advances in data processing and communications technologies create the potential for law to migrate
from the traditional forms of rules and standards to microdirectives that update and change in real time with the changing personal circumstances of the regulated citizen. But for this personalization to work, lawmakers must know and precisely state the
objective of law up front in a way that has never before been required. Indeed, the entire purpose of personalization is to fit legal
outcomes to relevant contextual factors. Big data can facilitate
that fit through greater accuracy in determining the relevant factors for a law’s application. But the relevance of any given factor
is ascertainable only by reference to the objective the law seeks to
achieve. And personalization technology, for all its promise,
cannot provide that objective. Moreover, the use of big data and
machine-driven analytics requires a statement of the objective in
the most precise and accurate form as inaccuracy and imprecision
can lead to perverse outcomes.10
The second question is how to communicate a law’s content
to citizens. The new personalization of law will lead to highly specific and complicated laws that must be translated and communicated to citizens in a form and at a time that makes compliance
possible. Along these lines, technology will allow for the personalization not just of the substance of law but also of the means
and timing by which a law’s directive is provided to a citizen.
Thus, in Part I of this Essay, we explore the importance and
challenges inherent in (1) identifying the objective of a personalized law and (2) deciding how and when to apply and communicate the content of a personalized law to citizens.
In Part II, we identify several specific logistical challenges
that manifest in implementing these two fundamentals: source
and quality of data, discrimination and bias, human intervention,
transparency of data, and regulation of the providers of personalized law.11

9
See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1410–12 (cited in note 2); Anthony J. Casey
and Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U Toronto L J 429, 431 (2016).
10 For discussion of perverse outcomes, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths,
Dangers, Strategies 120–22 (Oxford 2014).
11 We have addressed this final question about regulating the providers of such laws
in the public law context in The Death of Rules and Standards and in the private law
context in Self-Driving Contracts. See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1417–23 (cited in
note 2); Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J Corp L 1,
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I. TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
As a preliminary note, we observe that law collides with personalization in two prominent ways. First, many legal researchers have explored the issue of when and how the state should best
regulate the way private actors use algorithms to personalize
products. Some essays in this Symposium address this question
by looking at how well equipped the law is for dealing with this
type of personalization.12 Our focus, though, has primarily been
on the second issue: How can law be better personalized through
the use of algorithms? That is, how should the state use big data
and algorithms to personalize the production of law? These two
research agendas are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, many of the
issues raised—for example, data sources, privacy, discrimination,
and bias—are common to both strands of the literature. And as
the lines between private ordering and public law become blurred,
so too will the lines between these inquiries.
The new personalization of law will pose two fundamental
challenges. First, it requires lawmakers to be explicit about the
objective that a law seeks to achieve. When laws are not highly
personalized, lawmakers can and often do punt on this issue.
They leave it to citizens and judges to discover or invent their own
views about the purpose of a law. Big data and algorithms that
translate large amounts of information into specific legal directives do not, however, permit such ambivalence or hand-waving.
Instead, they require (and facilitate) an up-front and clear statement of an objective. Second, the new personalization poses new
questions about the methods and timing of the application of a

26–31 (2017). Additionally, Professor Gillian Hadfield provides extensive analysis of related issues of how to regulate private providers of law in a world of increasing information
technology. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law
and How to Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy 249–59 (Oxford 2016). This
Symposium also includes a deep dive into the question by Professor Andrew Verstein. See
generally Andrew Verstein, Privatizing Personalized Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 551 (2019). As
a result, we will do little in this Essay other than flag the issue as one major concern in
virtually every personalization project.
12 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a
Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U Chi L Rev 217 (2019) (examining
how to respond to data-driven price discrimination); Talia B. Gillis and Jann L. Spiess,
Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U Chi L Rev 459 (2019) (examining possible legal
responses to automated credit pricing); Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmüller, Down by
Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the
Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U Chi L Rev 581 (2019) (examining possible
negative effects of personalization on business to consumer transactions).
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law and communication of its directive to citizens. This Part explores these two challenges.
In this Essay, for expository purposes, we use the extreme
form of personalization—the microdirective—to demonstrate the
concerns and questions raised by personalization. One can think of
the microdirective as the idealized version of a personalized law.
With a microdirective, lawmakers create a law that is nothing more than a general objective. It looks like a standard. But a
microdirective also provides for an algorithm to use big data to
transform that objective into a specific rule-like and personalized
directive that is communicated to the citizen when the citizen
needs to know the content of the law. Early forms of microdirectives already exist. For example, smart traffic lights collect data
inputs to personalize the directives provided to drivers at an intersection. One can think of a yield sign as a standard, a stop sign
as a clunky rule, and traffic lights and smart traffic lights as progressions toward the more personalized microdirective.
A.

Objectives

The use of big data and algorithms to provide the contours of
law will force lawmakers to address the question of what, precisely, is the objective of a particular law. To what end are we
creating this highly contextual and personalized law? Personalizing a law means taking into account the personal factors of the
individual to whom it applies. But to take a factor into account,
one must ask: For what purpose? A personal factor relevant in
answering one legal question will be irrelevant in answering
another. Another way to think about it is that personalization
makes a law more accurate (less error prone).13 But how does one
define accuracy and error? Again, the answer comes from understanding the objectives of the law. An error is an application of
the law that does not achieve its objective. To know whether an
error has occurred, one must understand that objective.
Conventional law—with its vagaries and lack of personalization—often allows lawmakers to avoid this question. A speed limit
may be imposed to achieve one of many goals, which might include reducing accidents, promoting efficient transportation, or

13 See Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417, 1458 (2014) (noting that the value of
algorithms using big data to personalize default rules lies in the ability to make the law
more accurate).
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reducing pollution. But the lawmakers need not make their goal
clear. And they may not even need to have a goal. They can use a
crude rule (55 miles per hour) with no personalization and leave
the objective unstated. Or they can use a standard (drive reasonably) that leaves it to the driver and the judge to figure out the
objective.
Predictive algorithms and big data do not work that way.14
The lawmaker has to tell the algorithm what to do with the data.
She must specify an ex ante objective.15 Such specification is not
unique to the new personalization of law. All lawmakers and
judges make implicit judgments about the objective of a law when
they announce the content of that law. But the problem becomes
crucial when using big data and automated technology to achieve
a purpose. In the context of algorithms, the objective will be fixed
once the program is initiated and must be stated with precision if
it is to be translated into code. Thus, the new personalization of
law forces two things with regard to objective setting: clarity and
forethought. 16 The objective must be known and programmed
with clarity, and this must be done at the time of the algorithm’s
creation.
There are different modes through which law can set an algorithm’s objective. We will explore two to demonstrate the importance and challenges of objective setting, and then we will examine one way that lawmakers can use data to avoid explicitly
setting an ex ante objective.
1. Algorithmic legislation.
First, algorithms could improve ex ante legislation.17 This is
the clearest avenue to add accuracy through personalization. Ex

14 See Jerry Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: What Everyone Needs to Know 94–95
(Oxford 2016). See also Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 Wash L Rev 87,
102–10 (2014).
15 As Professor Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst put it, when using data to find
relevant correlations, there is a first step of “problem specification”: “translat[ing] some
amorphous problem into a question that can be expressed in more formal terms that computers can parse.” Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
Cal L Rev 671, 678 (2016).
16 See Michael Luca, Jon Kleinberg, and Sendhil Mullainathan, Algorithms Need
Managers, Too: Know How to Get the Most out of Your Predictive Tools, 94 Harv Bus Rev
96, 99 (Jan–Feb 2016) (explaining the importance of having explicit, defined, and quantifiable goals for algorithms).
17 An alternative but related version of this is personalization through algorithmic
administrative regulation. We have argued elsewhere that that avenue is the most likely
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ante laws are often the least personalized and do not do a good
job of achieving their objective. There are high ex ante costs of
discovering and articulating all relevant factors.18 As big data reduces those information costs, personalization can make law
more accurate. Speed limits provide a canonical example. Consider the errors created by having one-size-fits-all speed limits.
Lawmakers might use big data to create personalized speed limits (communicated to the driver’s dashboard) to minimize car accidents. But minimizing car accidents is not the only objective involved in setting a speed limit. An algorithm programmed merely
to minimize accidents would simply set the speed limit at zero.19
One has to know and articulate all of the competing objectives of
a personalized law and their relationship to each other to provide
a means of balancing potential error reductions.
In the speed limit example20—which will become highly important in the regulation of the software behind self-driving
cars—the lawmaker must make an ex ante judgment about the
precise balance between speed of travel, the risk of accidents, pollution, the consumption of fuel, and so on. 21 Indeed, she must
public source of personalization. Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1418 (cited in note 2).
For the analysis here, the concerns are the same.
18 Examples of inaccurate impersonal rules abound. Indeed, in this Symposium
alone, several are discussed. See Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 255, 262–63 (2019) (discussing an example
of inefficient mandatory contract rules that ignore relevant personal characteristics);
Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U Chi L Rev 489, 494–95 (2019) (discussing criminal procedure rules that may ignore personal expectations of privacy); Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law,
86 U Chi L Rev 309, 314–24 (2019) (discussing consumer and privacy laws that ignore
consumer heterogeneity); Adi Libson and Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 527, 528 (2019) (discussing copyright laws that
ignore the value of content to users).
19 See Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal Stud at 260 (cited in note 3).
20 We use the speed limit example because the availability of the relevant data is
obvious. There is much available data on driving; thus, it is an area in which we should
expect some of the quickest moves toward personalization. This example demonstrates
one key point about personalization: the supply of relevant data will be a major factor in
locating the emergence of personalized law.
21 See generally Oliver Moore, Toronto to Use Big Data to Help Reduce Traffic Congestion (The Globe and Mail, Apr 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8R2E-AERU. See
also generally Yuanfang Chen, et al, When Traffic Flow Prediction Meets Wireless Big Data
Analytics (arXiv.org, Sept 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/CWU4-CZYG. Beyond
personalizing the speed itself, you might even personalize the fines for violations based on
concepts of deterrence and social equality. See, for example, Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U Chi L Rev 1869, 1876–79 (2018). In this way,
personalized law could be a set of personalized fines or prices presented to citizens. There
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insert specific weights for these measurable values. Without personalization, lawmakers can obscure those value judgments. But
when one tries to use data about personalized factors to predict
outcomes and set a rule, one needs to know and declare the specific outcome desired.
2. Algorithmic judging.
Second, algorithms could assist (or perhaps even replace)
judges to improve the accuracy of decisions.22 Arguably, conventional judicial application of law is more personalized than conventional legislative statements of law.23 Judges can take more
factors into account because they are applying the law after all
the evidence is in. But there are costs to this. Judges may make
mistakes in determining which factors are relevant, or they
may—intentionally or not—seek to achieve the wrong objective in
determining the relevance of various factors. The result is that a
judge may deliver decisions that do not align with the objective of
the law. That is problematic for two reasons: (1) there are errors
in the fit of the application of the law, and (2) those errors create
inconsistency and variance that make it harder for citizens to
comply with the law.
The new personalization of law can reduce both of these errors. A recent study using big data and machine learning technologies in the context of granting and denying bail provides a telling
example of how data can improve the personalization of law by

is much efficiency to be gained by such price discrimination. But as Professor Oren BarGill points out, algorithmic price discrimination can also be used to take advantage of the
one paying the price. Bar-Gill, 86 U Chi L Rev at 230–31 (cited in note 12). See also Wagner
and Eidenmüller, 86 U Chi L Rev at 585–86 (cited in note 12) (describing “first degree
price discrimination,” under which individual consumers are charged different prices). The
fact that the price is coming from the lawmaker may reduce our worry about advantagetaking, but that certainly will not always be true.
22 Again, there is a close alternative option: personalization through algorithmic enforcement, in which enforcement officers or agencies use big data to personalize the application of laws and regulation in each case. See Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett, and
Albert H. Yoon, Regulation by Machine *2–3 (Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems, Dec 2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/L9LJ-T3RB.
23 This personalization is less costly with ex post adjudication, as the adjudicator has
to figure out only the context-specific applications for cases that actually arise, whereas
an ex ante rule has to address all possible applications. See John O. McGinnis and Steven
Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 Fla L Rev 991, 1030 (2014); Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at
1003–04 (cited in note 3); Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 582 (cited in note 2).
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judges.24 In most jurisdictions, the stated objective of a bail decision requires a judge to balance the risk that the defendant will
flee or commit another crime against the costs and burdens of incarceration.25 Judges are not given specific directives, and so it is
up to them to personalize the law when applying it to a specific
case.
In the study, machine learning techniques were shown to provide more accurate assessments of risk, which, if used by the lawmaker, could allow for a reduction in both the detention rate of
defendants and the rate of crimes committed by those who were
released.26 This suggests that the algorithm does a better job at
eliminating irrelevant factors and at assessing those factors that
are relevant to achieving the law’s objectives.
The authors of the study do note one difficulty in their study:
judges may be maximizing other objectives or preferences. 27
While judges may inject their own preferences when determining
an objective of a law, algorithms will not inject new objectives.
This raises an important concern. To the extent that lawmakers
value their ability to delegate objective setting to judges, then algorithmic personalization would not be preferred unless the law
delegates to the judges the power to create the algorithm as well.
It is worth noting that allowing an individual judge to set the
objectives of law is highly problematic. It reduces democratic accountability and consistency in the law. Judges might introduce
bad objectives without disclosing them, or they may simply fail to
achieve the good objectives they set. Again, the bail study is illustrative. The study suggests that the algorithmic bail program can
reduce crime and detention rates while also “reducing racial
disparities.”28 This suggests that judges either were intentionally
imposing discriminatory purpose on the law or, more likely, were
taking into account discriminatory factors that were not relevant
to the putative objective of the law.29

24 Jon Kleinberg, et al, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q J Econ
237, 240–45 (2018).
25 See, for example, the standard in Massachusetts, where bail is determined by
examining the alleged crime, the likely penalty, the likely flight risk, history of defaults,
family in the area, employment status, and previous criminal records, among other
criteria. Mass Ann Laws ch 276, § 57. The Kleinberg study looks primarily at data from
New York. Kleinberg, et al, 133 Q J Econ at 246 (cited in note 24).
26 See Kleinberg, et al, 133 Q J Econ at 285–86 (cited in note 24).
27 Id at 243 (“[D]ecisions that appear bad may simply reflect different goals.”).
28 Id at 241 (emphasis added).
29 More on this below in Part II.B.
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What makes personalization in the bail context work is that
a measurable objective can be clearly stated.30 The takeaway is
that algorithmic personalization can improve the fit of personalized law and reduce errors if the data are available and lawmakers can agree on the definition of an error. The corollary is that
personalizing some areas of law, through legislative or judicial
algorithms, may be problematic because lawmakers or the general polity do not agree on the objective. Sentencing of criminal
defendants provides a salient example. Competing objectives like
retribution and deterrence will lead to different outcomes through
personalization. The factors that are relevant and the data that
are necessary will look very different based on which objectives
the lawmakers choose. With conventional lawmaking, we tolerate
(to some extent) a human judge, legislator, or police officer injecting her version of the law’s objective after the fact. Algorithmic
personalization does not tolerate such a wait-and-see approach.
This is likely to be the biggest impediment to personalization. In
areas of law for which no ex ante consensus exists as to the purpose of a law, conventional lawmaking may endure. On the other
hand, one might question the legitimacy of a law whose purpose
cannot be identified.31
3. Using judicial data.
There is a shortcut that may allow a lawmaker to avoid setting an objective when developing ex ante microdirectives. In
some areas of law, lawmakers could use big data to predict what
judges would do based on past decisions and implement those predictions rather than achieve a stated ex ante objective. 32 This
30 This is not to take a position on whether this is the right objective. The point,
however, is that, if one has a clearly stated objective function that values reducing crime,
detention rates, and racial disparities, there is evidence that an algorithm can “improve”
personalization by improving judicial outcomes on every dimension even though the algorithm was developed with only the first two objectives in mind.
31 One might also argue that allowing human variation with regard to the purpose
of a law is a feature rather than a bug because it provides for experimentation and the
evolution of the law. Algorithms could, of course, be programmed to intentionally introduce arbitrary ex post variation. But that would have to be programmed as part of the ex
ante objective. And it is likely that citizens will be more squeamish about arbitrary variation when it is intentional and automated than when it is dressed up in the “reasoning” of
a judicial opinion.
32 Researchers have illustrated the power of machine learning tools to predict outcomes of cases decided by courts. See, for example, Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett, and
Albert H. Yoon, Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Law, 58 Can Bus L
J 231, 235–36 (2016); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I
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method has the result of incorporating the collective objective
function of the population of past judges. To be sure, this does not
add any new personalization to the law. Instead, this method
simply entrenches the existing personalization that exists in judicial applications of law, but with the potential added benefit of
consistency.
In areas that have generated a wealth of litigation, algorithms can be used to map judicial behavior and predict—or replicate—how judges in similar cases would have decided these
cases. When using existing case data as the basis for microdirectives, the objective of the algorithm is to predict the outcome that
would be reached by judges who decided prior cases.33 The algorithm seeks to find hidden patterns in the data and weigh factors
the way judges would.
The objective of such an algorithm is not to add personalization to the law but to improve it, primarily by reducing the inconsistency of judicial decisions and minimizing the likelihood of outlier decisions while still allowing for the law to take into account
the personal factors of individuals. Thus, using the algorithm as
the basis for the law provides citizens with greater certainty and
consistency. An ancillary benefit that emerges from the use of
algorithms is the reduction in ex post administration costs. There
are fewer cases litigated in a world in which outcomes can be
predicted.34
This mechanism of algorithmic judging will be particularly
attractive when lawmakers cannot agree on a precise objective of
a law but do agree that the approaches taken by judges are

Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal
Services Industry, 62 Emory L J 909, 936–42 (2013). See also Daniel Martin Katz, Michael
J. Bommarito II, and Josh Blackman, A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 7–15 (Apr 2017); John O.
McGinnis and Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 Fordham L Rev 3041,
3046–53 (2014).
33 There are complicated questions of what this would mean for implementation. For
example, if an algorithm suggests that 60 percent of judges would classify a defendant as
liable, what should the algorithm do? If it simply says defendant is liable, that changes
the probabilistic outcome a litigant faces. This changes settlement and deterrence calculations. An alternative approach would be to impose damages at 60 percent. But that
would reflect a dramatic shift in legal doctrine. These are some of the difficult technical
implementation questions posed by the use of algorithms in law.
34 See Part I.B for a discussion of how improvements in communication technology
will allow predicted outcomes to be communicated to litigants.
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generally satisfactory and that consistency is important. For example, it may be difficult to identify the exact policy considerations behind the distinctions between employees and independent
contractors. What objectives should underpin the tax law or employment law on this question? How much weight should lawmakers put on the various considerations of revenue maximization, unemployment reduction, and equity concerns? These
weights may be difficult to specify ex ante. It may be much easier,
however, to simply observe the ways in which these distinctions
manifest themselves in the case law when judges decide actual
cases.
But there are, of course, important questions and concerns
that will arise when replicating existing case law in algorithmic
form. First, this method of personalization is not suitable when
the underlying objective of the law shifts over time. Second, and
relatedly, even though the biases of individual outlier judges will
diminish, the new law will replicate any systematic biases that
are baked into existing case law. Third, if we replace judicial decisions with algorithmic decisions, then there will be fewer (or
perhaps no) new cases. This means that the system of law will not
learn or evolve. Fourth, there may not be sufficient data to capture every future contingency. Ex ante personalization of this
type relies on having enough judicial decisions to predict what
will happen with other, hypothetical cases. Areas of law that are
rarely litigated are not suitable candidates for this type of algorithmic judging.
B.

Timing the Application and Communication of Law

The previous Section deals with the content of law. This
Section deals with the timing of law. There are two questions that
big data personalization raises about timing: (1) When and how
is the legal directive communicated to the relevant citizen?
(2) And when does the government commit itself to a specific application of the law?
Big data combined with advances in communication technology opens up new possibilities for timing by reducing the personalization trade-off that lawmakers otherwise face. Communication technology adds two innovations: (1) it enhances options
about when to reveal that law’s content and directive to a citizen,
and (2) it simplifies the form in which that content and directive
is revealed.
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To see why these are important, consider the conventional
views of the personalization trade-off. Traditionally, law is personalized through ex post adjudication of standards. Judges with the
benefit of hindsight look at all the relevant factors and then personalize the law. Thus, more personalization comes at the expense
of waiting. 35 This ex post method imposes two important costs:
uncertainty36 and the potential for government misbehavior.37
The uncertainty arises because citizens do not know how the
law will apply to their specific situation. Judges are unpredictable, make mistakes, and may consider factors that do not seem
relevant to the citizen. The risk of government (or judicial) misbehavior arises because the government (through judges or some
other adjudicator or enforcer) can decide the content of the law
after the individual has already acted. This discretion can be
abused.38 The government—because it is not precommitted to the
law’s outcome—could use its after-the-fact discretion to punish
disfavored citizens, 39 to impose outcome or distributive preferences that are not part of the law’s intended objective, or to
change the objective based on hindsight bias.40
Personalization through big data, rather than through ex
post adjudication, can reduce these problems. We start with uncertainty. When law is personalized through ex post adjudication,
the communication of the law’s effect on that action is delayed
until after the action occurs.41 With big data and advances in communication, the effect can be communicated to the citizen as soon
as the relevant evidence about the citizen’s personal characteristics and situation is available.42 Thus, in some (but not all) cases,
35 See Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol
101, 101–03 (1997); Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 585–86 (cited in note 2).
36 See Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 974–77 (cited in note 3); Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at
569, 575 n 42, 587–88 (cited in note 2); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1689–1701 (1976). See also Richard Craswell and
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L Econ & Organization
279, 285–88 (1986).
37 See Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other Comments on Formalism
in the Tax Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 915, 919 (1999); Posner, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 113
(cited in note 35); Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 974–76 (cited in note 3).
38 See Levmore, 66 U Chi L Rev at 919 (cited in note 37).
39 See Posner, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 113 (cited in note 35).
40 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,
1179 (1989).
41 See Posner, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 101–03 (cited in note 35); Kaplow, 42 Duke
L J at 585–86 (cited in note 2).
42 The timing of content creation also changes when law is personalized. The more
personalized a law is, the more likely it is that relevant factors will come into existence
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the law’s personalized application to a case can be communicated
before the citizen has to act.
Importantly, technology can also transform the personalized
law into a simplified form of communication. For an example, consider the smart traffic light, which uses data inputs to personalize
traffic directives. In raw form, the personalized microdirective
would be incomprehensible to the driver. It would contain a whole
catalog of contingent directives that turn on traffic patterns,
weather, time of day, proximity of other vehicles, and so on. The
technologies at work translate that information into the simple
form of a green or red light that is communicated to the driver.43
Now consider the government misbehavior problem. Even
though an algorithmic microdirective could be programmed to
take into account factors that are not known when the law is
enacted, the government could precommit to the law’s objective.
Indeed, lawmakers could rely on an algorithm that prevents
human intervention after the citizen has acted but still takes all
relevant personal context into account. In this way, the
government would bind itself against abusing ex post discretion
even when the law is personalized and takes into account factors
that become known only after the law is promulgated.44 Thus, the
use of an automated personalization algorithm can prevent the
lawmaker from changing the law’s content or directive based on
illegitimate ex post factors.45
With traditional law, however, there is an additional cost to
government precommitment. In some cases, precommitment facilitates evasion. In many regulatory areas, there is a strategic
only later in time, right before the moment that the law becomes applicable. But it still
could become available before the action is required. On the topic of how advance rulings
promote certainty, see Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Advance Tax Rulings, 29 Va Tax Rev 137, 144–49 (2009). See also Carlo
Romano, Advance Tax Rulings and Principles of Law: Towards a European Tax Rulings
System? 320–32 (IBFD 2002).
43 This demonstrates another key point about the new personalization of law. It is
most likely to occur first in areas of law in which complex information about contextual
factors can be easily gathered, processed in the relevant time frame, and then transformed
into a simple communication to the citizen. Thus, we should expect to see personalization
thrive in fields like the regulation of food and drug safety, securities law, tax law, workplace safety regulation, consumer law, and police accountability.
44 For a more detailed exploration of this idea, see Casey, Short Happy Life at 30:07
(cited in note 5).
45 In some sense, this is like a governmental version of Professor Lee Fennell’s
analysis of individual precommitment. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Personalizing Precommitment, 86 U Chi L Rev 433 (2019). Just as individuals may desire to bind themselves
in the future, governments may want to do the same thing.
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game between the lawmakers and the regulated citizens. Regulating evasion in tax law provides a salient example. If you reveal
the content of the law up front, the taxpayer can structure her
behavior to evade the spirit of the law.46 On the flip side, if you
have a standard like “behave reasonably,” the government can
change the rules of the game after the fact and take advantage of
those who acted reasonably in good faith.47
This problem can potentially be solved by delaying the revelation of the law’s directive until after the citizen has committed
to action. This idea of delayed content revelation48 provides a partial solution to the evasion-commitment problem. The government commits to the law ex ante (so it functions like a rule). But
the taxpayer does not know the content and thus must comply
with the law as if it were a standard. This prevents the search for
technicalities and loopholes that are invited by a preannounced
rule. And the law is still personalized in a way that traditional
precommitment would not have allowed. That said, uncertainty
for the taxpayer remains. And so the use of delayed revelation
will be optimal for areas of personalized law in which uncertainty
is less of a concern than evasion.
All of this is to say that the timing of the communication and
application of law can be tailored to optimally fit the context of
the particular law in a particular situation. The law could communicate the personalized directive as soon as it is known, at the
moment it becomes relevant to the citizen, whenever the citizen
requests it, or even after the citizen has acted.49 And it can take
various forms (simple or complex).
This content-revelation question will be important for all of
personalized law. Citizens will sometimes have an incentive to
alter their personal characteristics to take advantage of the personalization. In some cases, this will be desirable. Often citizens
desire to follow the spirit of the law. And real-time information
about how to comply helps with that. Well-designed traffic lights
46 See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 860,
869–72 (1999).
47 See id at 860; Levmore, 66 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 37); Scalia, 56 U Chi
L Rev at 1180–82 (cited in note 40).
48 Professor Saul Levmore explored the idea of delayed revelation as a means of combatting evasion in 1999. Levmore, 66 U Chi L Rev at 919–20 (cited in note 37).
49 One additional limitation on timing is the ability of the algorithm to gather evidence about personal characteristics of the citizen in question. This suggests that personalized law, at least when ex ante revelation is important, will be successful in areas in
which evidence about the relevant characteristics and factors is readily available.
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have this characteristic. Most drivers want to obey traffic lights
that prevent accidents. One can even envision automated traffic
rules that provide rewards in the form of open lanes or green
lights for drivers who opt into safer behavior or other favored
characteristics.50 Other areas of law, such as tax, are different because citizens have a greater incentive to try to evade the spirit
of the law.51
The important takeaway here is that, in addition to setting
clear objectives, lawmakers must also understand for each area
of law the factors that determine the optimal timing and form of
the application and communication of personalized law.
II. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES
In this Part, we discuss five additional challenges, each of
which relates to the fundamental questions we explore above:
(1) source and quality of data, (2) discrimination and bias,
(3) human intervention, (4) transparency of data, and (5) regulation of the providers of personalized law. The tasks of choosing
data sources and preventing bias and discrimination are essentially projects in identifying the correct objective of personalized
law and considering the costs of obtaining data relevant to that
objective. Similarly, the issues of human intervention and transparency pose questions about how to identify and deal with errors
in objective setting and how to use timing to precommit to a legal
directive. And the choice and regulation of the provider of personalized law turn on questions about setting the objective and communicating law’s content and directives to citizens.
A.

Data

The question of whether an algorithm can achieve the objective of the law turns on the quality of the data that a lawmaker
relies on. The concern here is whether the data actually measure
the relevant factors and adequately predict the central objective
of the law. This raises obvious procedural issues. How much relevant data are available? Who collected the data—are they impartial, and what biases do they bring? How and why did they collect

50

We already see early forms of this in high-occupancy-vehicle lanes.
Judicial replication is never the appropriate mechanism when evasion of this type
is a concern.
51
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the data? What potential biases are lurking in the data, and can
those biases be corrected?52
The objective and the form of data are intrinsically linked. If
measuring expectations or social objectives, one might turn to
survey data to try to extract information. If replicating decisions
of human decisionmakers, one might look to data sources of case
law or regulatory decisions. Indeed, one might think of judicial
decisions as surveys of past decisionmakers from which we extract broader principles. If seeking to minimize consequential errors, the consequences in the objective have to be measurable. In
the bail example,53 if the objective requires an algorithm to assess
the risk of the accused fleeing or committing a crime, one would
need data that accurately describe the behavior of accused persons who have been granted bail in the past. But observational
data may reflect biases, not only of those who collect the data but
also of those actors who influence particular variables of interest. 54 For example, data on whether accused persons commit a
crime while out on bail may reflect the biases and resources of
those who police and prosecute crimes.
Fundamentally, the data have to be well tailored to the objective. Researchers must account for potential asymmetries in
the measurement of errors. The bail example again proves helpful. Here, the researchers are able to measure two types of error.
First, they observe whether errors were made in granting bail by
measuring consequences. 55 That is, some accused persons are
granted bail and then commit crimes or flee. But to measure the
other type of error—the error of denying bail to less risky individuals—the researchers exploit variation in the way that judges decide cases. 56 Some judges are more lenient than others. Only
through this judicial variation could the researchers observe the
error of denying bail. Creators of algorithms have to be conscious
52 See generally Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases
Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Crown 2016) (exploring biases inherent in big data
in a number of contexts, such as employment, insurance, and criminal law).
53 See notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
54 See, for example, Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash L Rev 1, 13–14 (2014) (“The biases and
values of system developers and software programmers are embedded into each and every
step of [the] development [of credit-scoring software].”); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash U L Rev 1249, 1262 (2008) (describing the possibility that programmers’ individual biases, such as a preference for binary questions, could be embedded
into the algorithms they create).
55 See Kleinberg, et al, 133 Q J Econ at 247 (cited in note 24).
56 See id at 261–62.
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of this asymmetry. A law personalized through algorithms may
eliminate variation. As a result, new information about denying
bail would be unavailable. Resolving this problem may require
artificial randomization in order for the evolutionary algorithm to
“learn” about the different types of errors.57
Second, the need for expansive data raises privacy questions.58 The data collected may infringe on the privacy expectations of individuals who may not know where and how their information is being used. This is frequently raised as a concern in
the regulation of private companies using big data to personalize
products.59 But it is, of course, an issue for any public law that
requires the government to have access to personal data.60 This
raises additional questions about the need for—and limits of—
consent by citizens, whether the government should compensate
citizens for the use of their data,61 and who should collect the data
on behalf of the government.62
These types of issues have attracted the attention of legal
scholars. Notably, Professors Niva Elkin-Koren and Michal Gal,

57 Similarly, personalization that sorts people in the consumer context may reduce
the availability of data in the future. Consider Professors Ben-Shahar and Porat’s proposal
of personalized mandatory contract rules. Ben-Shahar and Porat, 86 U Chi L Rev at 265
(cited in note 18). If all Type A consumers are subject to a certain mandatory contract rule,
we may lose information about how their preferences change subsequent to implementation and how they would act in a world without a mandatory rule. See id at 255.
58 See Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 BC L Rev 93, 96–109 (2014); Omer
Tene and Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 239, 251–52 (2013). See also Craig Konnoth, Health
Information Equity, 165 Penn L Rev 1317, 1333–46 (2017) (exploring the various privacy
trade-offs inherent in big data use in health care). Concerns about who provides the algorithm and privacy will be especially important for personalization projects in consumer
law. See Ben-Shahar and Porat, 86 U Chi L Rev at 281–82 (cited in note 18).
59 See, for example, Mark Scott and Laurens Cerulus, Facebook Data Scandal Opens
New Era in Global Privacy Enforcement (Politico, Mar 26, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/9MMU-6YAA (discussing the reactions of global privacy regulators to the
Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal in 2016).
60 See Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1467–69 (cited in note 13).
61 See Niva Elkin-Koren and Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-byData on Data Markets, 86 U Chi L Rev 403, 414 (2019) (explaining that data collectors feel
reduced pressure to pay data subjects when the government uses the data); Eduardo
Porter, Your Data Is Crucial to a Robotic Age. Shouldn’t You Be Paid for It? (NY Times,
Mar 6, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/RS3S-QGR8. See also Michael Pollack, Taking
Data, 86 U Chi L Rev 77, 99–106 (2019) (arguing that the Takings Clause should apply to
personal data used by the government).
62 This is part of the broader question about who provides the algorithm. See
Part II.E.
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in their piece for this Symposium, discuss the fundamental tensions generated by data collection by private companies for the
purpose of commercial gain and by the government for the purpose of refining the law.63
B.

Discrimination and Bias

Related to the quality-of-data issue is the question of whether
the algorithm exhibits discriminatory behavior and bias. The new
personalization of law, with its emphasis on algorithmic decisionmaking, can reduce or exacerbate existing biases in the law.
Certain biases currently exhibited by adjudicators can be
tempered through the use of big data and algorithms. Most obviously, when an algorithm programmed in advance dictates the
application of the law to a case, there will be no hindsight bias.
Similarly, the impact of individual biases of judges should be reduced by the reliance on data rather than gut intuition. Humans
often consciously or unconsciously assume correlations that do
not exist. A human may have a biased view about what factors
matter when writing or applying a factor-based rule. That is, they
assume that some factors are relevant to an inquiry when they
are not. The use of big data to predict outcomes will help reduce
some of these biases.
In the bail example,64 the authors illustrate how a machinelearning algorithm can reduce racial bias in decision-making by
instructing the algorithm to focus on nonracial factors. 65 Importantly, their results suggest that the algorithm reduced racial
disparity and was better at achieving the law’s objectives when
compared to judges.66 More basically, the existence of their study
demonstrates a key point: we can audit the effectiveness of big
data personalization by auditing its outcomes just the same way
that the legal academy audits the old personalization of law by
human judges.67 And it is likely easier to correct an algorithmic
bias once detected than it is to correct a human bias.
63

See generally Elkin-Koren and Gal, 86 U Chi L Rev 403 (cited in note 61).
See notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
65 Kleinberg, et al, 133 Q J Econ at 275–78 (cited in note 24).
66 Id.
67 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in Robert E. Goodin, ed, The
Oxford Handbook of Political Science 275, 280–83 (Oxford 2009) (arguing that judges’
personal ideologies affect their decisions); Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New
Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831, 835–41 (2008) (finding that political preference, race,
gender, and other demographic characteristics sometimes have effects on judicial
judgments).
64
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On the other hand, and as noted above, the data itself might
be biased.68 Or discrimination may arise because of proxy variables and correlations that exist in society because of other systemic problems.69 Personalization adds contextual factors to the
law. Identifying and adding relevant contextual factors and removing irrelevant factors can increase accuracy and reduce pernicious biases. But there may be correlations in the data that suggest relevant factors—in the sense that they correlate with
certain outcomes—that have a discriminatory effect. Hard questions arise as to whether it is appropriate to consider these factors. And even if the law does not consider them directly, disparities might appear in the results through indirect relationships
and proxy variables. The question then is whether the law should
do anything proactively to reverse those disparities.
At first, this appears as a trade-off between accuracy in
achieving law’s objective and reducing discrimination.70 That is
the wrong framing. The real question here is one of determining
the appropriate objective in the first place. The law rarely functions on one dimension. Most laws have dynamic objectives. With
personalized law, the various dimensions must be understood.
There will often be arguments for sacrificing success on one dimension in service of success on another dimension. For example,
an algorithm that reduces crime while exacerbating societal inequalities presents difficult policy questions about objective setting. If lawmakers are unwilling to answer those questions, the
personalization of law will stall.71
68 See note 54 and accompanying text. See also Barocas and Selbst, 104 Cal L Rev at
684 (cited in note 15) (“[C]onclusions drawn from incorrect, partial, or nonrepresentative
data may discriminate.”).
69 For example, an employer may choose criteria for competency that happen to be
less common with members of the protected group due to systemic inequalities. The employer’s employment practices, made based on these criteria, will have a disparate impact
on the members of the group. See Barocas and Selbst, 104 Cal L Rev at 691 (cited in note
15) (noting that systematic discrimination may result when “the criteria that are genuinely relevant in making rational and well-informed decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies for class membership”).
70 See Ya’acov Ritov, Yuekai Sun, and Ruofei Zhao, On Conditional Parity as a
Notion of Non-discrimination in Machine Learning *16–19 (arXiv.org, June 26, 2017),
archived at http://perma.cc/NLK9-GXGX (analyzing whether minority neighborhoods pay
higher insurance premiums); Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish
Raghavan, Inherent Trade-offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores *17 (arXiv.org,
Nov 17, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/WWY7-7X7Q (concluding that no model of risk
assignment can meet every goal of fairness).
71 Selbst and Professor Barocas make a similar point in a slightly different context.
See Andrew D. Selbst and Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines,
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Human Intervention

Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans are
shut out of the process. Even after the objective has been set,
there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans are involved in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing
the merits of the algorithm. If the objectives of the algorithm and
the objective of the law are perfectly aligned at the ex ante stage,
one must ask: Under what circumstances should a human ignore
the algorithm’s suggestions and intervene after the algorithm has
made the decision?
To see how and when humans should intervene, consider the
different ways lawmakers can use algorithms to personalize the
law. Algorithms can merely provide human decisionmakers with
more information about the context of the decision. Alternatively,
algorithms can provide suggested decisions to a human or, in the
most extreme version, they can be translated directly into automated legal directives. For suggestions to a human, the question
will be: How much deference do the humans give to that suggestion? And for automated directives, the question is: When should
humans intervene and have the ability to override that directive?
While algorithms may reduce errors, they cannot completely
eradicate them. There will always be errors. And questions must
be asked about how best to stomach those errors. But the types of
errors made by an algorithm and the types of errors made by humans may be different. Some algorithmic errors will be obvious.
One need only look at the errors made by algorithms that identify
objects in pictures to determine that there is a mismatch of objectives.72 Thus, humans can—in cases in which the type of error is
clear—intervene. But in other cases, errors will be difficult to
identify. Algorithms will often identify counterintuitive connections that may appear erroneous to humans even when accurate.
Humans should be careful in those cases not to undo the very
value that was added by the algorithm’s ability to recognize these
connections. This is especially true when the benefit of the algorithm was that it reduced human bias and behavioral errors.

87 Fordham L Rev 1085, 1133 (2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7T3M-D7LU (“Questions
about justifying a model are often just questions about policy in disguise.”).
72 Selbst and Barocas catalog some of the interesting mistakes—some obvious and
some not so obvious—that experimental algorithms have made. Id at 1122–26.
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Moreover, when predictability is paramount, we may not
want humans interfering with the algorithm, injecting inconsistency into the system. Similarly, when a lawmaker’s precommitment to the outcome is of high importance, 73 it will be important to limit the possibility of human intervention. When
precommitment or overcoming human biases is important,
human intervention should be kept at a minimum.74
D. Transparency
Closely tied to the issue of human intervention is the question of transparency. Some argue that algorithms must be transparent in their reasoning in order for us to be able to use them
responsibly. One of the reasons presented in support of transparency is that it informs decisions about human intervention. While
traditional statistical techniques enable users to understand the
weights and interactions of different variables in the decision,
more complex machine learning algorithms do not allow for such
interpretation. This is true in part because the algorithms are
recognizing nonintuitive connections that human intuition
cannot recognize. As Andrew Selbst and Professor Solon Barocas
point out, the transparency problem “is a particularly pronounced
problem in the case of machine learning, as its value lies largely
in finding patterns that go well beyond human intuition.”75
Commentators have suggested that it is irresponsible for lawmakers to delegate duties to algorithms whose reasoning and decisions are not transparent. These concerns are misdirected. 76
First, it sets up a false comparison. Critics of algorithmic decisionmaking often emphasize the importance of human judges offering
reasons for their opinions.77 But the human brain is even more of

73

See text accompanying notes 44–45.
In the private context, as Professor Fennell points out, individuals often want to
prevent themselves from intervening with a directive in the future to deal with behavioral
self-control problems. See Fennell, 86 U Chi L Rev at 434–47 (cited in note 45). Similarly,
when the government is using a microdirective to precommit itself, human intervention
would be counterproductive.
75 Selbst and Barocas, 87 Fordham L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 71); id at 1094 (noting
that an algorithm’s ability to learn things “that humans might overlook or cannot recognize . . . render[s] the models developed with machine learning exceedingly complex and,
therefore, impossible for a human to parse”).
76 Selbst and Barocas provide a deep analysis of the various flaws in the transparency arguments. See id at 1089–93.
77 This critique reveals a particularly academic bias about what judges do. While the
appellate decisions taught in law schools are supported by written opinions, lower court
74
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a black box than machine learning algorithms. Judges’ written
opinions may simply provide ex post justification for opinions that
are actually driven by other factors.78
The fix here lies elsewhere. Algorithmic personalization requires transparency of the human process, not the computer reasoning. The relevant information to test the validity of an algorithm will be what objective it was given (and how that objective
was developed), how the algorithm was programmed to achieve
that objective, how the data was selected, and audit data on the
algorithm’s performance.79
E.

Regulating Providers

Finally, one of the most important logistical questions for the
personalization of law through big data is who provides (and who
owns) the personalization. This is true across the various methods
that we have discussed. We have made this point elsewhere,80 as
has Professor Gillian Hadfield, who suggests it will be one of the
most important changes coming in all of law. 81 Moreover,
Professor Andrew Verstein provides a deep analysis of the question in this Symposium.82 So we will say only a few words on the
topic.

judges are constantly ruling on motions and objections and entering orders without any
written opinions that can be examined after the fact.
78 Indeed, this disconnect between the stated reasons in judicial opinions and the
actual reasons is a major driver behind the robust existence of the field of judicial behavior.
Scholars have long recognized that many factors not stated in an opinion might be driving
outcomes. See generally, for example, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact
Discretion, 37 J Legal Stud 1 (2008) (modeling how judges find facts and arguing that the
summaries of facts in written opinions cannot be trusted); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like
Human Beings, 80 U Pa L Rev 17, 33–38 (1931) (explaining that even honest judges are
influenced by extralegal factors, such as their own prejudices).
79 Selbst and Barocas make a similar proposal in their article. Selbst and Barocas,
87 Fordham L Rev at 1130–33 (cited in note 71) (noting that personalization will “require
process, documentation, and access to that documentation” and proposing the idea of an
algorithmic impact statement).
80 See Casey and Niblett, 43 J Corp L at 30–32 (cited in note 11).
81 Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World at 323–45 (cited in note 11) (describing the potential pitfalls and benefits of third-party provision of legal infrastructure).
82 See generally Verstein, 86 U Chi L Rev 551 (cited in note 11). Rebecca Wexler also
provides a thoughtful analysis of the problems inherent in private ownership of sentencing
algorithms. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual
Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan L Rev 1343 (2018).
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An automated algorithmic method would require a public or
private software provider. A survey method would require a public or private survey process. The worry with a private provider is
that it could manipulate or game the system. It may be allied with
other private actors. Knowing the underlying code, running
preemptive surveys, or having advance access to data could give
asymmetric advantages to certain parties.
Again, an analysis of the objective of an algorithm is key. Privately created algorithms may serve to correct only one type of
error. For example, as Professor Dan Burk notes in this
Symposium, private enforcers of copyright may focus on reducing
infringement.83 How can the law best achieve outcomes that reflect the objectives of lawmakers if interested parties are creating
algorithms that define the bounds of the law?
Even when the provider of the algorithm is a neutral party,
the provider may not be forthcoming in revealing how the algorithm was created.84 This is especially true when a private provider has financial incentives to obscure the reasons why particular results are generated in order to heighten barriers to
competition or when it has reasons to favor one side because of
repeat-player issues.85
In these cases, the law should require government providers
or initiate regulation of these third-party providers. 86 On this
note, the law must be proactive. The personalization of law is
likely to develop in different ways and from varied sources, becoming a widespread phenomenon long before the legislature
takes any action.87
CONCLUSION
The key theme of this Essay is that everything in personalization comes back to objectives. If one propounds the benefits of
a personalized law through the use of an algorithm, one must ask
83

Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U Chi L Rev 283, 284 (2019).
See Wexler, 70 Stan L Rev at 1364–68 (cited in note 82) (illustrating how, in the
case of pretrial suppression hearings, “third-party developers will try to use intellectual
property law as a shield against judicial scrutiny”).
85 See Casey and Niblett, 43 J Corp L at 28–29 (cited in note 11).
86 See Verstein, 86 U Chi L Rev at 567–72 (cited in note 11) (discussing when the law
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whether the algorithm is achieving the law’s purpose. That will
be a comparative analysis among the three choices: (1) big data
personalization, (2) human judge personalization, and (3) no personalization. As long as big data provides better outcomes than
humans and better outcomes than blunt ex ante rules, then one
should not reject them simply because they are imperfect. One
wants to make sure the law is achieving its desired outcome
(without costly unintended consequences) better than the nextbest alternative. But this presupposes that lawmakers have been
able to identify a measurable objective. What does it mean for a
law to be “better”? Can we agree on the normative content of a
“better” outcome? Do we want a law based on consequentialism
or one that reflects a more deontological approach?
The trend toward the new personalization, therefore, presents a challenge for the lawmaker that has hitherto been relatively easy to set aside for a later date: What is it, exactly, that
we want the law to achieve? When this all plays out, it will not be
technological infeasibility or lack of data standing in the way of
personalized law. It will be the inability of humans to agree on
what law is designed to do.

